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POill'I 2: 
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Ti!AT OPiillON TESTil!OdY \/AS 111-
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lil THE SUPREt!E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
nrr ()j. UTAil, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 19013 
CLAUllE A. BUUDY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPLLLAi'lT' S BRIEF 
llATURE OF CASE 
Defendant-Appellant, Claude Albert Bundy, was charged 
with two first degree felony crimes, to wit: rape, in violation 
ci §76-5-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and forcible 
ooJorny, in violation of §76-5-403, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
1s "mended. 
DISPOSITIO" OF LO\ffirl COURT 
The Lower Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, 
judgment and imposed a sentence on the verdict of the 
: c<r'1 11npane l eJ to try and hear the case, 
RELIEF SOUGHT Oli APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant requests this Court to reverse 
J'1c.rc1ent oi' the Lower Court and remand the case to the District 
•rd new trial and other further proceedings. 
STATE!!EilT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was arrested and chnrg"Ll •.villi L,,,,, 
first degree felony crir.ies, consisting of rape and 
sodomy. These acts were alleged to have occurred between t''' 
Defendant and a Sherry Christiansen, a female under the age n1 
14 years, not his wife. 
The alleged victim was Sherry Christiansen. Sherr 7 
was the younger sister of the Defendant's wife. The evidence 
was that this Sherry had been a babysitter for the Defendant 
his wife for a period from April, 1981 through December, 1931 
This entailed her having to spend many nights at the Defendant 
and his wife's home in connection with the babysitting. The 
Defendant was working either regular work shifts or afternoon 
shifts, and the Defendant's wife was working graveyard shifts 
The acts were alleged to have occurred on a number of nights 
during the period at the home of the Defendant, and some acts 
allegedly at the home of the victim. 
In addition to the victim, the State called five (5) 
other witnesses. These were a Douglas Christiansen, the fathN 
of the victim and father-in-law of the Defendant; Lori C. 
the Defendant's wife; a Dr. Lillian TeiGland, a physician who 
examined the victim; Jesus Castaneda, a West Valley City PolicE· 
man who made an initial report; and Welby Scott, a West 
City Detective who did follow up work in this case, 
The only witness for the defense was the DefenuanL 
Claude Bundy, '"ho denied the act ions having occurred. 
- .2-
---
lJri,>t1 the c,J!ling of the Defendant's wife, counsel 
irr ie:> uent into char;ibers with the Judge to discuss 
, 1,1. 1,,11ridteness of the testimony of the wife, and objection 
,1 ,,1,. t:hc.ereto. (Tran. of Trial page 23 and 74-82). The off 
cne cecllni discussion concerned the nature of the testimonial 
µn',cilege 1.vith regard to marital co=unications. As a result 
ut the stateBent by the prosecutor that no co=unications 
-.wuld be gone into,and the lir;iited nature of the proposed tes-
imony, counsel for the Defendant did not object on the record 
co the calling and examining of the Defendant's wife. However, 
che Defendant 1Jas not present during said discussion, did not 
consent to said testimony, and later voiced strong and appro-
priate objection thereto. (See discussion at Tran. of Trial 
pages 74-32) 
At the close of the State's case, the Defendant again 
renew=d his raotion for mistrial setting forth the appropriate 
statute with regard to competency of Hitnesses. (See Tran. of 
Trial, pages 159-163). The Court again took the motion under 
and the Defendant was called to the stand. 
The jury returned with verdicts of guilty on both 
•• 0 11nt .c;, ancl the Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms 
the Utah State Prison of five years to life. The Court than 
ce111,2d the Defendant's 1;iotion for :aistrial. 
ARGill!E:lT 
POLIT l • THA'.'.' Tl-iE TRIAL COURT E!PROPERLY 
A,JO PL::.E.JUi.JICIALC,Y ALL01.JEJ THE 
CALLLiG TO THI:: STAlW A:rn THE 
1;::::;TIF'lldG OF Tl-iE o:.:FEilDAdT' S 
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WIFE. 
There has long been recognizcJ, bntli :it 1..._'(J1:1r;11Jn l 1 
and be statutory lau, a spous<ll i.vi:iLh IJr1)h1Ji· ,) 
circumscribes the testi;non:1 or one spouse agdinst another. 
is generally recognized that there are three separate t:rpes 
privilege which oight be in force and effect. In Court bt .. 
counsel for the State and t.1e Court apparently concerned the'l-
selves with two of the privileges, but ignored the third, as 
raised by counsel for the Defendant below. 
'.Lhe first type of privilege is normally knmm as c:1e 
"coapelled" privilege. This provides that a spouse can not ·ie 
compelled to give evidence against tl1eir spouse. Such is ex-
plicitly stated in the Utah Constitution, Article I, §12. 
was not really an issue in the case below, as the Defendant'3 
spouse, Lori C. Bundy, was willing to testify against her hus-
band. 
The second type of marital privilege is norr.ially re-
ferred to as the marital co!TIIilunication privilege. It is set 
forth in Rule 28 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In essence, 
it provides that confidential communications between spouses 
are privileged, and can not be testified to absent consent ui 
both parties. i"urther, such privilege exists beyond the term-
nation of the marriage. 
7he third t/pe of privilege has to Jo ""it:1 ti1e c 
tency of a spouse to tcestify against the other in t,1e au 0 c""c 
anv consent. It is set forth in §73-24-8, l'JSJ UCA, "•'">'"1 ·' 
-4-
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i 1111cnt part 
There are particular relations 
in ·,;hi ch it is the policy of the law 
to encourage confidence and to pre-
serve it inviolate. Therefore, a per-
son cannot be examined as a witness in 
the following cases: 
(1) A husband cannot be examined 
for or against his wife without her con-
sent, nor a wife for or against her hus-
band without his consent; nor can either 
during the marriage or afterwards be, 
without the consent of the other, exam-
ined as to any cou1I!lunication made by one 
to the other during the marriage; but 
this exception does not apply to civil 
action or proceeding by one against the 
other, nor to a criminal action or pro-
ceeding for a crime COLJ8itted by one 
against the other, nor for the crime of 
deserting or neglecting to support a 
spouse of child, nor where it is other-
wise specially provided by law. 
In the case at bar, the testimony of Mrs. Bundy was 
clearly in derogation of the Defendant's substantial rights not 
to have her testify without his consent, as she did testify. 
l'urther, tne prohibition contained in the above statute is ex-
ressed in teITJs of competency to testify. Thus, she was incom-
perent to testify at ali in the absence of his expressed consent. 
The discussions of the attorneys' for the parties and 
Court indicate that there was no consent by the Defendant and 
',1JL ciuch of the concern, mostly expressed off the record, had 
do 1.;ith the first two types of spousal privilege, and not the 
1.1hic·h was raised by the defense counsel. (See discussion of 
11ri"s Jl r,'ran. of Trial, pages 74-82, and pages 159-163). At 
Jas tne consent of the 0efendant obtained, and in fact, l 1](_" 
e ,r1rt>ssed disavmval and disapproval was noted. 
The prejudicial nature of the testimun? s.1.1ulJ ii .. 
be clear from the transcript of the trial 
charged with rape and forcible sodomy on his wife's litt Le 
ter. He denied that those actions occurred. Therefore 
credibility and believability of the victim and DefenJant <.Jere 
crucial, and the showing of loyalties to those two inJiviJuaL 
would help a jury in its choice of wi.om to believe. Thus, 
fact of the Defendant's wife freely testifying for the State 
against her husbanJ could easily be seen by the jury to be 
disparaging and prejudicial to the Defendant. Further, much 0 ; 
her testimony was of a prejudicial nature and manner :; 
put the Defendant in a bad light with the jury These incluJec 
such items as the young age of the Defendant at their marria0e 
and her sympathy toward the victim. In a close case, with two 
witnesses giving opposing views of what transpired, such subtle 
and indefinite factors often tip the balance in a jury's mind 
This Court has also recognized the subtle nature of 
violation of this privilege and the prejudice to a Defendant. 
In State v. Brown, 383 P.2d 930, 14 Utah 2d 324 (1963), the de-
fendant had been found guilty of raping a sixteen year old giri. 
His defense was alibi in that he haJ been at home with his 
at the time the alleged acts occurred. The defendant testificc 
but his wife did not testify. The district attorney, in drgucc 
to the jury stated that the one person besides the defenJ:int ·· 1 
could have testified that he was at home was the defend:rnt' 
and she did not testify. This court helJ that such cor.JLlenc '"1 
orivile;;e ;Jas ,irejudicial error and remanded the case bilck .in•;' 
-il-
, 11c'1,; u·iaL bused merely upon that one comment on the pri-
'11 1·he case at bar, the Defendant's wife did testify, 
11 L<>rne/ ior the State argued from some of the testimony 
I c,Jci< llCe that she gave. (See Tran. of Trial, page 193). 
rnrnT II: THAT OPINIOU TESTIMOHY WAS IM-
PROPERL y AD!IITTED WTO EVIDEHCE 
\IHICH PREJUDICED THE DEFENDA;n 
AilD PLAIU ERROR. 
During the course of the trial, evidence was admitted 
indicated that a charge a child molestation of the victim 
had i.ieen nade with the perpetrator being the victim's father and 
the Defendant's father-in-law. During the course of the trial, 
0:ficer Welbv Scott, a detective for West Valley City Police, 
that he did follow up work on that accusation. He 
al so 1Jas allm1ed to testify that the accusations, in his opinion, 
were unfounded and there was no substance to the charge. (See 
Tran. of Trial, page 151). Such an opinion testimony is improper, 
nrejudicial to the Defendant, and in the case at bar constitutes 
error which this Court can review. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion is governed by Rule 
•t of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Such Rule states: 
(1) If the witness is not testifying 
as an expert his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to such 
opinions or inferences as the judge finds 
(a) may be rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness and (b) are helpful to 
a clear understanding of his testimony or 
to the determination of the fact in issue. 
(2) If the witness is testifying as 
c1n expert, tes timon;r of the witness in the 
form of opinions or inferences is linited 
to such opinions as the judge finds are 
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(a) based upon facts or Jdtrl per-
ceived by or personal L:,' kno1m or 
made to known to the 1vitness dt 1he 
hearing and (b) within the scope of 
the special knowledge, skill, experi-
ence or training possessed by the 
witness. 
(3) Unless the judge excludes 
the testimony he shall be deemed to 
have made the findinG requisite to 
its admission. 
(4) Testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences otherwise ad-
missible under these rules is not 
objectionable because it embraces the 
ultimate issue or issues to be decided 
by the trier of the fact. 
Officer Scott, it is submitted, would in this instance 
be testifying not as an expert. The testimony concerns itseli 
with a resolution of factual issues and statements, Detective 
Scott is not qualified as an expert to resolve factual disputes. 
His testir;iony should have been limited to what actions, if anv, 
he took in investigating the charges. 
Even as an experienced and "expert" police officer, 
uetective Scott would not be competent to give his opinion as 
he did here. He would not be testifying based upon his special-
ized knowledge and training, and there is insufficient facts 
and data perceived by him to make such an opinion. Just as an 
officer would be prohibited from stating his opinion that, bas2: 
upon his experiences as a police officer, a defendant is 6uil: · 
beyond a reasonable doubt or that the evidence presented at er:,. 
indicates that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable c:c.' 
so this officer should not have been allowed to testL'' ''' ' 1 
was no basis to the allegation involving the 'Jictir:i' s :'J 1.:1e 1 
- 8-
'-' ihove testimon/ 11as not objected to by counsel 
l( 1 ( r1(J.-Jnt. lioweve?r, it is subrilitted that such an opinion 
"I 1riproper in a criminal case, and constitutes "plain 
" "u' 11 that this Court can review the matter. 
'.n a case such as this, here ti1is is an allegation of 
c,pe and forcible sodomy on a thirteen year old girl, and the 
uenies that the actions occurred, it is a close case 
r •r a jur; to decide. Further, subtle matters and factors and 
effects may s11ay and influence the jury differently than in 
cases involving other crimes and other evidence. Therefore this 
Court should review more closely the evidence adr.iitted at the 
Lrial to assure that irilproper subtle influences and factors are 
1ot laid before the jury such that they may base their decision 
improper matters. In the case at bar, in addition to the 
)efendant's denial, there was evidence of both a family cover 
and of a family conspiracy against this Defendant with regard 
11 this Defendant's actions in pendinG civil divorce litigation. 
1cJt familv conspiracy and cover up would include the Defendant's 
·.:ite, her sister the victim, and the victim's father. Therefore 
improper opinion by the Detective might have been highly 
irei11dic1:il and influential on the jury with regard to resolving 
·.lie uisputes between the Defendant and that family. As such, this 
'"Jurt should strictl; revietv that testimony to insure that improper 
.>L1, JiJ not influence the jury. 
COtJCLUS IOiJ 
lt is requested that t'.1is Court reverse the conviction 
-9-
and sentence of the Defendant and rem.ind tl!<e c1,1: 1 er L ,,,,,, 
to the Lower Court for a ne1v trial, c·,1se 1v,1s d Iii ,;:ii 
emotional.iy charged case involving heinous cTir:1es and 11 le:;,-
tions, and this Court should strictly revie1J the record 
Improper evidence, testimony, and procedures 1Jould have a pacr 
tially greater impact on a jury than in most other cases, 
fore, the prejudice to the Defendant and his fundamental righc 
not to have his wife testify against him, should mandate a re-
versal and reEJand. Further, the plain error of the opinion 
testimony of the Detective, and other evidentury imperfections 
in the record, in such a close case, should cause this Court 'c 
remand for a new trial. Although it is recognized that no tria: 
are ever perfect, and that errors exist in all trials, in 
a highly charged and close case as this one, this Court should 
remand for a new trial to insure that a jury does not base its 
decision on iTiproper factors. 
1983. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ___ day of August, 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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